We investigate whether and to what extent macroprudential policies affect the financial link between the center economies (CEs, i.e., the U.S., Japan, and the Euro area), and the peripheral economies (PHs). We first estimate the correlation of the policy interest rates between the CEs and the PHs and use that as a measure of financial sensitivity. We then estimate the determinants of the estimated measure of financial sensitivity as a function of country-specific macroeconomic conditions and policies. The potential determinant of our focus is the variable that represents the extensity of macroprudential policies. From the estimation exercise, we find that a more extensive implementation of macroprudential policies would lead PHs to (re)gain monetary independence from the CEs when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy; when PHs run current account deficit; when they hold lower levels of international reserves (IR); when their financial markets are relatively closed; when they are experiencing an increase in net portfolio flows; and when they are experiencing credit expansion.
Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 led many countries, including both advanced and developing ones, to face many policy challenges. In the aftermath of the crisis, with the hope of jumpstarting moribund economies, policy makers in the advanced economies, or the center economies (CEs), have implemented, sometimes experimentally, policies that had been deemed as unconventional such as the zero or negative interest rate policy and quantitative easing (QE).
The lax monetary environment of the advanced economies caused an influx of capital from low-yielding CEs to high-yielding emerging markets in the peripheries (PHs), bringing about a rise in capital inflows and currency appreciation pressure for the latter. Soon after the United States economy started showing signs of recovery in the early 2010s, however, the tide started turning around. In 2013, a mere mention by then Federal Reserve Board (FRB) chairman, Ben Bernanke, of the possibility of tapering off QE sent jitters to the emerging currency and bond markets ("taper tantrum"). As the U.S. Fed did actually start tightening monetary policy with the halt of QE in 2014 followed by the lift of the zero interest rate policy in 2015, capital flows started flowing back to the U.S. and other advanced economies, leading to the expectation of U.S. dollar appreciation and the depreciation of emerging market currencies. As the currencies became expected to get weaker, the perceived level of risk among EMEs rose because many of the firms in those economies were indebted in the dollar, which meant the debt burden would rise as the dollar appreciates.
This development of international macroeconomic events indicates how open emerging market economies are vulnerable to changes in the external environment, especially the financial conditions in the CEs. This background led the "global financial cycles" view by Rey (2015) to become widely debated. According to this view, exchange rate regimes no longer insulate countries from global financial cycles. Financial globalization has made countries' macroeconomic conditions more sensitive to the "global financial cycles" in capital flows, asset prices, and credit growth, so that the famous "monetary trilemma," or just "trilemma" -countries can only achieve the full extent of implementation in two, not all, of the three open macro policy goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and free capital mobility 4 -reduces to an 4 Also see Aizenman, et al. (2010 Aizenman, et al. ( , 2011 , Obstfeld (2014) , Obstfeld, et al. (2005) , and Shambaugh (2004) for further discussion and references dealing with the trilemma.
"irreconcilable duo" of monetary independence and capital mobility. Consequently, restricting capital mobility maybe the only way for non-center countries to retain monetary autonomy. Aizenman, et al. (2016 Aizenman, et al. ( , 2017 investigated whether Rey's view, the end of the trilemma hypothesis, is supported by the data. They focused on how the financial conditions of -and shocks propagated from -the CEs (i.e., the U.S., Japan, and the Eurozone) impact the economies in the PHs. They concluded that policy arrangements based on the trilemma do affect the extent of linkage between CEs' and PHs' financial conditions. In short, an obituary for the trilemma is not needed.
While the trilemma is not dead, it is true that open economies are subject to ebbs and flows of capital that are heavily affected by the state of economic and financial conditions of the CEs. That means, policy makers in the PHs need to play a balancing act; while being constrained by the trilemma, they also need to manage to prevent financial instability. As put it, we may now live in a world of "quadrilemma" where financial stability have been added to the trilemma's original policy goals. Successful navigation of the open economy quadrilemma helps in reducing the size of the transmission of external shocks to the domestic economy, and reducing the costs of domestic shocks. These observations explain the relative resilience of emerging markets, especially in countries with more mature institutions, buffered by deeper fiscal and monetary space.
In addition to, or instead of, developing mature institutions, some countries have relied on other policies to sustain financial stability. One prime example of policies emerging market economies recently have started adopting is macroprudential policies.
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For example, in recognition of the sources of Korea's vulnerabilities, since June 2010, South Korea has introduced a series of macroprudential measures aimed at building resilience against external financial shocks, especially against its well-known vulnerability to capital flow reversals in the banking sector and the associated disruptions to domestic financial conditions. Other emerging market economies such as Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, and Thailand also implemented macroprudential policies facing an influx of capital in the aftermath of the GFC. For reviews on macroprudential policies, Bank of England (2009 , Claessens (2014) , Galati and Moessner (2011, 2014) , IMF (2013a,b) , Lim et al. (2011 ), Ostry, et al. (2012 , and Pasricha, et al. (2017). 6 In fact, macroprudential policies predate those implemented in the aftermath of the GFC. An oft-cited example is Chile's unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) on foreign borrowing. RR was also implemented by Germany and other western European countries in the 1970s to curb capital inflows. For a historical overview of regulatory attempts to control capital flows, refer to Gosh, et al. (2018) .
The recent implementations of macroprudential policies have led to a rise in the literature that investigates the efficacy of macroprudential policies such as Buch and Goldberg (2017) , Cerutti, et al., (2015) , Ghosh, et al. (2014 Ghosh, et al. ( , 2015 , Lim, et al. (2011 ), Ostry, et al. (2012 , and many others. This paper will be an addition to this literature. We will investigate whether and to what extent macroprudential policies affects the financial link between the CEs and the PHs.
In our previous works, we looked at the effect of trilemma policy configurations of the PHs on several CE-PH financial links. In this study, we focus on the link between the CEs and the PHs through policy interest rates. We are particularly interested in examining whether a set of macroprudential instruments can be another policy tool for the PHs to remain monetary autonomy. While developing and emerging market economies maneuver ebbs and flows of capital that are heavily influenced by the state and policies of the CEs, macroprudential policies may complement the traditional open macro policies such as exchange rate regimes and financial liberalization. It is important to investigate whether and to what extent developing and emerging market economies delink themselves from the sphere of influence of the CEs by implementing macroprudential instruments. Finding out the effectiveness of macroprudential policy will provide more clues on how to navigate the world of quadrilemma.
Our empirical method relies upon a two-step approach. We first investigate the extent of sensitivity of policy interest rate while controlling for global factors. The estimation is done for the sample period is 1986 through 2015, using monthly data and in a rolling fashion. Next, we examine the association of these sensitivity coefficients with the extensity of macroprudential policy implementations while controlling for country's trilemma choices, the real and financial linkages with the CE, the levels of institutional development, and the like.
In what follows, we present the framework of our main empirical analysis in Section 2.
Each of the two steps for the estimation is explained in this section. In Section 3, we present empirical results for the estimations while focusing on the effect of macroprudential policies. In Section 4, we investigate the interactive effects between macroprudential policies and macroeconomic conditions and policies. We make concluding remarks in Section 5.
The Framework of the Main Empirical Analysis
We extend the same approach as followed in Aizenman et al. (2016 Aizenman et al. ( , 2017 , with special focus on the macroprudential policies as one of the potential determinants of the financial link between the CEs and the PHs. As the first step, we regress the policy interest rate of the PHs on those of the CEs while controlling for global factors. If country i has its monetary policy more susceptible to the monetary policy of one (or more) of the CEs, the correlation of the policy interest rates between the CEs and PHs should be significantly positive, implying a closer linkage between the CEs and PHs, and also that the PH of concern has less of monetary autonomy.
Once we get the estimated coefficients of the CEs' policy interest rates, which we treat as the variable for the degrees of financial sensitivity, as the second step, we regress the estimated degree of sensitivity on potential determinants, including sample countries' macroeconomic conditions or policies, real or financial linkage with the CEs, the level of institutional development of the countries, and the extensity of macroprudential policies. If macroprudential policies can affect the extent of monetary independence in a way that they help economies of our concern to retain monetary independence, the estimated coefficient should be significantly negative.
The First-Step: Estimating Sensitivity Coefficients
The main objective of this first step estimation is to estimate the correlation of the policy interest rates between the CEs and peripheral economy i, while controlling for global factors. We regress the policy interest rate of peripheral economy i ( it Y ) on the vector of the policy interest rates of the three CEs, i.e., the U.S., the Euro area, and Japan, as shown in (1). We focus on the estimated coefficient C Fi ˆwhich represents the extent of financial sensitivity of peripheral country i to the three CEs:
We do not include China as one of the CEs. Aizenman, et al. (2016) find that despite the recent impressive rise as an economic power, China's contribution in the financial sector still seems negligible in a historical context. Considering that the Shanghai stock market crash in the summer of 2015 and the winter of 2016 significantly affected financial markets in the U.S., Japan, and Europe, one expects that the role of China as a CE and connectivity with it will become substantial in the near future. The same kind of argument can be made about whether other large emerging market economies such as Brazil, Russia, and India can be the center economies that exert global influence. While their role as major economies in the world has been rising, we would still have to wait for future research to identify their increasing influence in the global economy. Hence, we use the "shadow interest rates" to represent a more realistic state of liquidity availability for the three advanced economies. For the U.S. and the Euro area, we use the shadow interest rates estimated by Wu and Xia (2014) . For Japan, we use the shadow rates estimated by Christensen and Rudebusch (2014) .
We also have global factors ( G i Z ) as a group of control variables in the estimation. As the "real" variable, we include the first principal component of oil prices and commodity prices. We apply the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to do the estimation for each of the sample countries which amount to about 100 countries, including advanced economies (IDC), less developed countries (LDC), and emerging market countries (EMG) the latter of which is a subset of LDC.
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The sample period is 1986 through 2015, using monthly data, with regressions implemented over non-overlapping three year periods. That means that we obtain time-varying C Fit ˆ across the panels. For all the estimations, we exclude the U.S. and Japan. As for the Euro member countries, they are removed from the sample after the introduction of the euro in January 1999 or they become member countries, whichever comes first. This is true especially after the ECB and the Bank of Japan lowered their policy rates down to zero but before they adopted negative interest rates. The use of the first principal component of oil and commodity prices is to avoid multicollinearity or redundancy.
The emerging market countries (EMG) are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during the period of 1980-1997 by the International Financial Corporation plus Hong Kong and Singapore.
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Endogeneity can be an issue for this type of estimation. As a robustness check, we re-estimated the first-step model by lagging the right-hand-side variables. However, it did not change the characteristics of the results (not reported). Hence, we keep the estimation method as it is.
The Second Step: Baseline Model
Once we estimate 
Here, the choice of variables is based on a wide variety of literature pertaining to spillover effects and global synchronization of financial or macroeconomic variables. Hence, we assume that the above estimation model takes a reduced form, rather than a structural form, by which we can address various theoretical predictions at once, rather than relying on one particular theory or model.
There are four groups of explanatory variables. The first group of explanatory variables is a set of open macroeconomic policy choices ( i OMP), for which we include the indexes for exchange rate stability (ERS) and financial openness (KAOPEN) from the trilemma indexes by . As another variable potentially closely related to the trilemma framework, we include the variable for IR holding (excluding gold) as a share of GDP because we believe the level of IR holding may affect the extent of cross-country financial linkages.
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The group of macroeconomic conditions, or i MC includes inflation volatility, current account balance, and gross national debt (as a share of GDP).
The group of the variables that reflect the extent of linkages with the center countries (LINK) includes trade linkage, which we measure as:
IMP is total imports into center economy C from country i, normalized by country i's GDP.
LINK also includes variables for financial linkage, for which we use the ratio of bank lending from center economy C to country i as a share of country i's GDP.
Another variable that reflects the linkage with the major economies is the variable for the extent of trade competition (Trade_Comp). Trade_Comp measures the importance to country i of 12 This estimation method keeps recursively down-weighting the outliers until it obtains converged estimates.
13 Aizenman, et al. (2010 Aizenman, et al. ( , 2011 show the macroeconomic impact of trilemma policy configurations depends upon the level of IR holding. export competition in the third markets between country i and major country C. 14 A higher value of this measure indicates country i and major economy C exports products in similar sectors so that their exported products tend to be competitive to each other.
The fourth group is composed of the variables that characterize the nature of institutional development (INST), namely, variables for financial development and legal development. 
The Macroprudential Policy Index (MPI)
MPI is the variable of our focus. We assume it represents the extensity of the implementation of macroprudential policies, for which we use the macroprudential policy dataset developed by Cerutti, et al. (2015) . This dataset is based on a comprehensive survey conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), called Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments 14 Shocks to country C, and especially shocks to country C that affects country C's exchange rate, could affect the relative price of country C's exports and therefore affect country i through trade competition in third markets. See Appendix 1 for the variable construction.
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However, since the estimate of the legal development variable is found to be persistently insignificant, this variable is dropped from the estimation.
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That is, there are FM-depth, FM-access, FM-efficiency, and FI-depth, FI-access, FI-efficiency. Each of the six sub-indexes is the first principal components of the component variables. For further details, refer to Svirydzenka (2016).
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Sampling data from the first year of each three-year panel could still entail bidirectional causality. As another way of mitigating endogeneity or bidirectional causality, we could lag the right-hand-side variables, but by one threeyear panel. Lagging the right-hand-side variables this way could mean that we assume it takes three to five years for the right-hand-side variables to affect the dependent variable, which we do not think is plausible.
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Lastly, to control for economic or financial disruptions, we include a vector of currency and banking crises (CRISIS). For currency crisis, we use a dummy variable based on the exchange market pressure (EMP) index which is calculated using the exchange rate against the currency of the base country. The banking crisis dummy is based on the papers by Laeven and Valencia (2008 . MPI is the sum of the following 12 dummies variables, each of which takes the value of unity when the policy instrument of concern is implemented by the country. We treat MPI as the measure for the extensity of macroprudential policy implementation. Cerruti, et al. (2015) make it clear that each of the dummies does not "capture the intensity of the measures and any changes in intensity over time." 20 Although each dummy does not directly refer to the stringency of individual policy measures, MPI, as an aggregate of the 12 dummies, does reflect the extensity of the macroprudential measures. To shield domestic financial markets from the influence of external factors, countries may increase the number of macroprudential policy instruments to make the aggregate effect stronger. Hence, extensive uses of macroprudential policies should make the aggregate set of policy instruments more intensively 19 For more details on the dataset, refer to Appendix 2 as well as Cerruti, et al. (2015) . 20 The authors also argue that codifying the degree of intensity of the measures would involve a certain degree of subjective judgements.
effective. Therefore, the extensity of macroprudential measures should also be highly correlated with the level of intensity of macroprudential policies. These 12 dummy variables can also be categorized as those macroprudential policies mainly representing policies that are intended to affect the behavior of borrowers (BORROWER) and those representing policies that are intended to affect the behavior of lenders (FINANCIAL).
BORROWER is composed of loan-to-value ratio caps (LTV_CAP) and debt to income ratio (DTI), and FINANCIAL is of LTV_CAP, DTI, DP, CTC, LEV, SIFI, INTER, CONC, FC, RR_REV, CG, and TAX.
Using MPI, we examine whether and to what extent the implementation of macroprudential policies, as an aggregate, affects the financial linkages between CEs and PHs.
We will also disaggregate the impact of macroprudential policies and examine whether and to what extent borrower-or lender-based macroprudential policies affect the CE-PH links. These variables are included in the estimation as three-year averages. Because MPI-related indexes are available for 2000-2013, the sample period now is composed of three-year panels start in 1998-2000.
Empirical Results

First-Step Estimations -Connectivity with the CEs
As the first step, we estimate the extent of correlation of the policy interest rates between the CEs and the PHs while controlling for two kinds of global factors: "real global" and "financial global," using the three-year, non-overlapping panels in the 1986-2015 period.
To gain a birds-eye view of the empirical results and the general trend of the groups of factors that influence the financial link, we focus on the joint significance of the variables included in the real global and financial global groups, and vector X C the latter of which includes the policy interest rates of the CEs. Before moving onto discussing the results from the second-step estimations, let us summarize the findings of the second-step estimations from our previous studies.
We find the arrangement of open macro policies such as the exchange rate regime and financial openness have direct influences on the sensitivity to the CE's. As theory suggests, we find that an economy that pursues greater exchange rate stability and financial openness would face a stronger link with the CE's through policy interest rates and REER movements. In short, the trilemma matters.
We also find that the degree of exchange rate stability and financial openness do matter for the level of sensitivity when they are interacted with other variables such as current account balances, gross national debt, trade demand, and financial development. For example, if a developing country receives higher import demand from the CE's, that would strengthen the link between the peripheral and center economies through policy interest rates when the PH has a policy arrangement of pursuing both greater exchange rate stability and financial openness. Such a policy arrangement would also make the impact of having greater gross debt on the link between CE's and PH's REER. Thus, we conclude that open macro policy arrangements do have both direct and indirect impacts on the extent of sensitivity to the center economies.
In Aizenman, et al. (2017) , we generally find evidence that the weights of major currencies, external debt, and currency compositions of debt affect the degree of connectivity.
Having a higher weight of the dollar or the euro in the implicit currency basket would make the response of a financial variable such as REER and EMP in the PHs more sensitive to a change in key variables in the CEs such as policy interest rates and REER. Having more exposure to external debt would have similar impacts on the financial linkages between the CEs and the PHs.
Lastly, we find that currency composition in international debt securities matter. Generally, those economies more reliant on the dollar for debt issuance tend to be more vulnerable to emanating from the U.S.
Results of the Second-Step Estimation: Do the Macroprudential policies matter?
We now use the estimation model based on equation (2) and investigate the determinants of the extent of linkages through the policy interest rate,
C Fit
ˆ, while focusing on the impact of macroprudential policies. Table 2 reports the estimation results for the LDC and EMG samples.
Generally, compared to the results in our previous study , the results are unaffected despite the inclusion of the MPI in the estimation.
PHs with more open financial markets tend to follow the monetary policy of the CEs, though the extent of exchange rate stability they pursue does not matter.
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The positive coefficient on inflation volatility means that countries with highly volatile inflation cannot maintain monetary independence. Those peripheral countries that export competitive products to the CEs may be more able to delink the link of the policy interest rates with the CEs, while those with stronger trade links with the CEs tend to have a stronger connectivity through the policy interest rates with the CEs. The more developed financial markets a PH country is equipped with, the more connectivity through policy interest rates it has with the CEs. This result may reflect that countries with more developed financial markets tend to be more exposed to arbitrage opportunities so that their interest rates tend more to be equalized or synchronized with those of the CEs. The model, however, does not fit very well for the subsample of EMGs.
The effect of macroprudential policies on the financial link between the CEs and PHs is not observed. Although the estimated coefficient of the MPI variable is negative for both LDCs and EMGs, it is never statistically significant.
The MPI index can be disaggregated into those borrower-targeted (BORROWER) and those targeted for financial institutions (FINANCIAL). We now replace the MPI with BORROWER or FINANCIAL individually, or both of them together. Table 3 reports the estimation results only for the estimates of BORROWER, FINANCIAL, or both.
Again, we do not observe any significant effect of these variables -in Table 3 , neither BORROWER nor FINANCIAL enters the estimation as a significant determinant whether the variables are included individually or together. Do these results suggest that macroprudential policies do not affect the financial connectivity between the CEs and the PHs? We cannot make such a conclusion too hastily. 21 Aizenman, et al. (2017) find that the links through other financial variables are affected by the degree of exchange rate stability. Hence, unlike the "global financial cycles" argument by Rey (2013) , the type of exchange rate regimes does matter.
The effect of macroprudential policies may differ depending on the conditions of the CEs or PHs. Macroprudential policy instruments received more attention when several important emerging market economies such as Brazil, Korea, and Indonesia, implemented these policies against the influx of capital caused by unconventionally lax monetary policy of the CEs. Given that, the effectiveness of the macroprudential policies may differ whether the CEs implement a policy that contributes to an influx of capital to the PHs or an efflux of capital from the countries. Table 4 . Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of the MPI becomes significantly negative for LDC. That indicates that macroprudential policy help these economies to retain monetary independence. In other words, macroprudential policies may help PHs to shield the influence of the CEs' policy interest rate changes. This evidence is consistent with the fact that many emerging market countries implemented macroprudential policies when they experienced a rise in capital inflows in the aftermath of the GFC. The coefficient of the MPI is also found to be negative for the EMG subsample, but it is not statistically significant. Figure 5 illustrates the contributions of the right-hand side variables to the estimated financial sensitivity for Israel, Korea, and Turkey, using the estimates from the regression for LDC reported in Table 4 Thus, the effect of the MPI is not just econometrically significant, but also economically significant.
When we disaggregate the MPI into BORROWER and FINANCIAL and include them either separately or together, the estimation results shown in Table 5 indicate that the negative effect of the MPI variable in Table 4 come from the macroprudential policy instruments that are targeted for lenders, i.e., financial institutions.
The above findings are not observed when the estimation is conducted for the remaining three-year panels. These empirical findings suggest that the effect of macroprudential policy is discernible only when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy that eventually causes a 22 For the sake of simplicity of the graph presentation, we omit showing the contributions of the time fixed effects as well as the estimated constant.
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As we will see in the next section, the negative correlation between the MPI and the estimated gamma is more applicable to countries running current account deficit and holding lower levels of IR. As of 2007-09 and 2010-12, Turkey ran current account deficit while Korea and Israel ran current account surplus, the latter two countries of which held relatively sizeable IR. The exercise here does not distinguish between current account surplus and deficit countries, or between high and low IR holders. Hence, we are showing the "average behavior" between these different types of economies. Economies like Korea and Israel could also implement active and preemptive macroprudential policies if they are "prudentially" afraid of the tail risk of rapid worsening of their domestic financial market conditions. rise in capital inflows among developing countries, but not when the CEs implement contractionary monetary policy. In other words, the impact of macroprudential policies is asymmetrical. That explains why we did not find a significant impact of macroprudential policies in the baseline regression.
Further Analyses
We saw that macroprudential policies could affect the financial link between the CEs and the PHs through the policy interest rates, especially when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy. The effect of macroprudential policies might also depend upon several other macroeconomic or policy conditions of the PH countries that implement the policies.
Let us now examine how the effect of macroprudential policies on the financial link might change depending on the macroeconomic or policy environment of the PHs. We test how third factors could affect the effectiveness of macroprudential policies on the interest rate channel between the CEs and the PHs while continuing to restrict our sample period to the periods of CEs' "loose" monetary policy.
First, we test the impact of current account balances. Although we observed that macroprudential policies become effective only when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy, the effectiveness of macroprudential policies should differ whether the PH country of concern is a net recipient of capital or a net lender. Historically, current account deficit countries are more receptive to external shocks than surplus countries.
To test that, we divide the sample of LCD, or EMG, into the country-years in which the PH runs current account surplus and those in which they run deficit. Table 4 reports the estimation results for the MPI variable. The negative effect of macroprudential policies on the interest rate link between CEs and PHs is observed only for current account deficit countries for both LDC and EMG subsamples. That means that macroprudential policies allow PHs to retain more monetary independence from the CEs when they are net recipients of capital, while macroprudential policies do not matter for current account surplus countries.
The level of international reserves holding might matter for the effectiveness of macroprudential policies. If a country holds a large volume of international reserves and implement macroprudential policies, those policies may be more effective because holding a large volume of IR could send a positive signal that the country is less vulnerable to external shocks. In this case, it can be argued that IR holding plays a supplemental role to macroprudential policies. At the same time, however, macroprudential policies and IR holding could have a substitutive relationship to each other. In that case, even if a country does not hold a large volume of IR, active implementations of macroprudential policies might function as an alternative buffer to external shocks.
Our estimation results suggest that macroprudential policies and IR holding have a substitutive relationship with each other. Table 5 reports the results from the estimations in which we divide the sample of LDC or EMG depending on the level of IR (as a share of GDP) is greater or lower than the sample medium. According to the estimation results, for EMG countries which do not hold high levels of IR, implementing macroprudential policies could help them mitigate the impact of a change in the CEs' policy interest rates on their own interest rates, i.e., they can retain more monetary autonomy from implementing macroprudential policies.
The impact of macroprudential policies could also depend upon the degree of openness to international financial markets of the country that implements the policies. We divide the sample into two subsamples depending on whether our measure of capital account openness (the ChinnIto index) is above or below the sample medium and rerun the estimations. In Table 6 , we observe that macroprudential policies could be more effective when the economy of concern is relatively financially closed. This means that when a PH country tries to shield itself from capital inflows diverted from the CEs, having more closed financial markets would help for the macroprudential policies to be more effective. Conversely, for PH economies with more open financial markets, macroprudential policies would not be sufficient to manage capital inflows.
The purpose of implementing macroprudential policies is to shield the influence of policy changes made by the CEs so that the country that implements the policies could retain its own monetary autonomy. We have seen that PHs' macroprudential policies are effective when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy. In such a situation, a lax monetary environment among the CEs would cause capital to flow into emerging market economies with higher yields, which could cause credit to expand in the latter. Monetary policy makers of the PHs might become concerned that increased credit in their economies might become out of controls, against which policy makers may implement macroprudential policies. Given this, the effect of macroprudential policies may be more discernable when the PH economy of concern is experiencing an increase in capital inflow and also an expansion of credit. Table 9 divides the sample depending on the portfolio net inflow (as a share of GDP) is experiencing a positive or negative growth. The coefficient of the MPI is negative for the LDC sample for the economies that are experiencing growth in net portfolio inflows. The estimated coefficient of the MPI for the EMG group is also negative, but only marginally significant (pvalue = 16%). Macroprudential policies are discernably effective when the PHs are experiencing an increase in portfolio net inflows.
In Table 10 , we divide the sample depending on whether the country of concern is experiencing a growth of credit higher than its own median or not.
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The MPI variable enters the estimation for both the LDC and EMG subsample with a significantly negative coefficient.
Taken together with the results of Table 9 , we can conclude that macroprudential policies can become effective when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy, that causes a rise in portfolio net inflows and credit expansion in the PHs.
Concluding Remarks
The implementation of unconventional monetary policies by the advanced economies in the aftermath of the GFC significantly affected capital flows globally. Encountering a surge of capital flows, many emerging market economies faced the need to maneuver macroeconomic policy so as to alleviate the impacts of spillovers from the advanced economies. One such example is macroprudential policies, which were put in place by many emerging market economies as an attempt to mitigate the impact of changes in cross-border capital flows on domestic financial markets and to prevent financial instability. In this paper, we empirically investigated how the financial link through policy interest rates between the CEs and PHs can be affected by the implementation of macroprudential policies by the PHs.
We utilized the investigation framework we used in our previous works to examine the determinants of the financial link (Aizenman, et al. 2016 and examined whether and to what extent a set of macroprudential policies affect the extent of sensitivity through policy interest rates between the center, advanced economies (i.e., the U.S. the euro area, and Japan) and developing and emerging market countries in the peripheries.
From the baseline estimation exercise, at a first glance, we found that the extensity of macroprudential policies (measured by the macroprudential policy index, MPI) does not affect 24 We measure credit growth as a percentage growth of liquid liabilities as a share of GDP. the degree of connectivity through the policy interest rates between the CEs and the PHs. When we investigated the impact of the disaggregated macroprudential policies, still, its impact on the BE-PH link through the policy interest rates was not evidenced.
However, when we focused on the time periods when the CEs implement expansionary monetary policy, we found that macroprudential policies do matter and negatively affect the interest rate connectivity between the CEs and the PHs. This finding suggests that macroprudential policies have an asymmetrical effect that arises only when CEs' lax monetary policy causes capital to flow to the PHs. We also found that the above negative impact of MPI is mainly driven by lender-targeted macroprudential policies.
The effectiveness of macroprudential policies can vary depending on the macroeconomic conditions or policies of the PH economies that implement them. Hence, we examined whether and how macroeconomic conditions and policies could affect the effectiveness of macroprudential policies.
We found that PH countries' policy interest rates could become more independent of CEs' when macroprudential policies are implemented by the countries with current account deficit. In other words, macroprudential policies could work more effectively for countries that import capital from overseas.
When we compare high IR holding countries with low IR holding ones, the estimated coefficient of the variable for macroprudential policies was found to be significantly negative, i.e., weakening the policy interest rate link between the CEs and the PHs, only for low IR holders. This suggests that countries with low levels of IR holding may use macroprudential policies as a substitute to holding high levels of IR.
When we compare the PH countries that are experiencing a rise in net portfolio inflows with those which are not, we detected the effect of macroprudential policies only among those with increasing net portfolio inflows. We also compared the PH countries that are experiencing credit growth with those which are not and found that only those which are experiencing credit growth have a significantly effect on their macroprudential policies. Thus, we have been able to show the effect of macroprudential policies as the "fourth" factor in the quadrilemma. It must be noted that macroprudential policies are not the same as conventional capital controls policies. What makes macroprudential policies different from conventional capital controls is that macroprudential policies are aimed at mitigating the balance sheet exposure associated with short term debt flows while typical capital controls are blunt instruments that focus more on affecting capital flows and less on mitigating the balance sheet exposures. That may explain our findings that the effect of macroprudential policies are detected only when the CEs implement expansionary policy and when the PHs' domestic credit conditions are affected.
Clearly, it is better to use more nuanced or detailed cross-country data on macroprudential policies, rather than relying on crude dummy variables, so that we can identify which types of macroprudential policies are effective or ineffective under what kind of policy or macroeconomic conditions. However, such an exercise is outside the scope of this paper. We will tackle on this issue as one of the future research agendas. .
International reserves -international reserves minus gold divided by nominal GDP. The data are extracted from the IFS.
Gross national debt -It is included as a share of GDP and obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
Trade demand by the CEs
IMP is total imports into center economy C from country i, that is normalized by country i's GDP and based on the data from the IMF Direction of Trade database.
FDI provided by the CEs -It is the ratio of the total stock of foreign direct investment from country C in country i as a share of country i's GDP. We use the OECD International Direct Investment database. Bank lending provided by the CEs -It is the ratio of the total bank lending provided by each of the CEs to country i shown as a share of country i's GDP. We use the BIS database.
Trade competition -It is constructed as follows.
Exp , is exports from large-country C to every other country in the world (W) in industrial sector k whereas W k W Exp , is exports from every country in the world to every other country in the world (i.e. total global exports) in industrial sector k.
Exp , is exports from country i to every other country in the world in industrial sector k, and GDPi is GDP for country i. We assume merchandise exports are composed of five industrial sectors (K), that is, manufacturing, agricultural products, metals, fuel, and food. This index is normalized using the maximum value of the product in parentheses for every country pair in the sample. Thus, it ranges between zero and one.
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A higher value of this variable means that country i's has more comparable trade structure to the center economies.
This variable is an aggregated version of the trade competitiveness variable in Forbes and Chinn (2004) . Their index is based on more disaggregated 14 industrial sectors.
Financial development -It is the first principal component of private credit creation, stock market capitalization, stock market total value, and private bond market capitalization all as shares of GDP.
26
Currency crisis -It is from Aizenman and Ito (2014) who use the exchange market pressure (EMP) index using the exchange rate against the currency of the base country. We use two standard deviations of the EMP as the threshold to identify a currency crisis. To construct the crisis dummies in three-year panels, we assign the value of one if a crisis occurs in any year within the three-year period.
Banking crisis -It is from Aizenman and Ito (2014) who follow the methodology of Laeven and Valencia (2008 . For more details, see Appendix 1 of Aizenman and Ito (2014) .
Share of export/import -The share of country i's export to, or import from, a major currency country (e.g., Japan) in country i's total export or import. ˆ from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for the three-year panels and the constant are also included, though their estimates are not reported. ˆ from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for the three-year panels and the constant are also included, though their estimates are not reported. 1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2014 EMG U.S. Japan Euro 
